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Abstract: M-dwarf stars are more abundant than G-dwarf stars, so our position as observers on a planet
orbiting a G-dwarf raises questions about the suitability of other stellar types for supporting life. If we
consider ourselves as typical, in the anthropic sense that our environment is probably a typical one for
conscious observers, then we are led to the conclusion that planets orbiting in the habitable zone of G-dwarf
stars should be the best place for conscious life to develop. But such a conclusion neglects the possibility that
K-dwarfs or M-dwarfs could provide more numerous sites for life to develop, both now and in the future. In
this paper we analyse this problem through Bayesian inference to demonstrate that our occurrence around a
G-dwarf might be a slight statistical anomaly, but only the sort of chance event that we expect to occur
regularly. Even if M-dwarfs provide more numerous habitable planets today and in the future, we still expect
mid G- to early K-dwarfs stars to be the most likely place for observers like ourselves. This suggests that
observers with similar cognitive capabilities as us are most likely to be found at the present time and place,
rather than in the future or around much smaller stars.
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Introduction
Recent results from the space-based Kepler mission as well as
ground-based observations have shown that terrestrial planets
are about as likely to exist orbiting M-dwarf stars as G-dwarf
stars like our Sun. The occurrence of rocky planets in the hab-
itable zone around M-dwarf stars is *20% (Dressing &
Charbonneau 2015), similar to the occurrence rate of *22%
for G- and K-dwarf stars (Petigura et al. 2013)1. M-dwarf
stars are more numerous than other stellar types and comprise
about 75% of the galactic main sequence stellar population,
compared with about 7% for G-dwarf stars. Stars smaller
than G-dwarfs also have longer main sequence lifetimes and
the expected lifetime of M-dwarf stars is at least ten times
that of our Sun. Ground-based surveys have recently found a
terrestrial mass planet in the habitable zone of the M-dwarf
Proxima Centauri, which is our nearest neighbouring star
(Anglada-Escudé et al. 2016), as well as three terrestrial mass
planets in the habitable zone of the M-dwarf TRAPPIST-1,
which is about 40 light years away (Gillon et al. 2017). These
observations all suggest the possibility that habitable planets
are more numerous around M-dwarf stars.
The philosophical implications of this bias toward
non-G-dwarf stars was expressed by Loeb et al. (2016) as:
‘The question is then, why do we find ourselves orbiting a
star like the Sun now rather than a lower mass star in the fu-
ture?’ The basis for this reasoning is encompassed in the an-
thropic principle, which requires that the universe must be
compatible with our status as conscious observers. Because
we find ourselves around a G-dwarf star, even though we pre-
dict that K- and M-dwarf stars are more numerous, does this
mean we should conclude that we are somehow privileged
observers that exist at an unlikely time and place? Such an
extraordinary claim would suggest that the emergence of
conscious observers on Earth was an extreme statistical
fluke or our understanding of habitable environments is
significantly flawed.
In this paper, we discuss several solutions to this problem
that draw upon recent theoretical modelling studies of the
habitability of rocky planets around G-, K- and M-dwarf
stars.We demonstrate that our status as observers on a planet
orbiting a G-dwarf star is not an improbable statistical
anomaly, even if other stellar types are better situated for
hosting conscious life.
Anthropic reasoning
When considering the factors that led to our emergence as con-
scious observers on Earth, we tend to expect that we should
find ourselves in a typical cosmic environment, that we are
1 Other studies obtained lower estimates for this occurrence rate of 2%
(Foreman-Mackey et al. 2014) and 6.4% (Silburt et al. 2015).
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more likely average than unusual. This form of reasoning is
known as anthropic reasoning, which requires that our obser-
vations of the universe are compatible with our existence as
conscious living beings. Precursors to anthropic reasoning in-
clude the Copernican principle or the principle of mediocrity,
which have been used to argue against a geocentric cosmology
with Earth’s place at the centre of the universe in favour of he-
liocentrism. However, reasoning with the Copernican principle
carries the risk of overstating our mediocrity; after all, our ex-
istence as conscious, living observers in a universe filled with
lifeless planets necessitates that there must be something atyp-
ical about our planetary environment. To improve upon
Copernican reasoning, Carter (1974) proposed the anthropic
principle by arguing that our existence as intelligent, conscious
beings on Earth imposes a selection bias when we observe the
universe. For example, humans require liquid water to survive,
so we should not find it particularly strange that we happen to
exist on a wet planet – even if dry planets are more common.
Anthropic reasoning leads us in the direction of assuming that
Earth is a typical example of an environment suitable for the
emergence of conscious observers.
One of the most precise forms of anthropic reasoning is the
self-sampling assumption (SSA), which has been thoroughly
discussed and critiqued by Bostrom (2002). SSA, as defined
by Bostrom (2002), states that, ‘One should reason as if one
were a random sample from the set of all observers in one’s ref-
erence class.’ By ‘random sample’wemean that we should give
equal probability (credence) to finding ourselves as any par-
ticular observer in our reference class. By ‘set of all observers’
we mean all observers that actually exist in the past, present, or
future. By ‘reference class’ we mean the set of entities that
count as observers of the universe in the same sense as we
do. (We provide an operational definition of reference class
in the section ‘The reference class’ below.) SSA allows us to
make probabilistic predictions that assume we are average
(as if randomly selected) members of our reference class.
With a naive application of SSA, wemight conclude that be-
cause we find ourselves orbiting a G-dwarf star like the sun,
other conscious observers in our reference class (if they exist)
must also be more numerous on habitable planets around
G-dwarf stars. However, this conclusion is inconsistent with
observational evidence suggesting that K- and M-dwarf stars
host a greater number of habitable zone planets and may pro-
vide more climatologically stable abodes for life against the ef-
fects of main sequence brightening (Dressing & Charbonneau
2015; Cuntz & Guinan 2016; Haqq-Misra et al. 2016). This
suggests a more precise expression of the application of SSA
to our problem at hand:
Premise P1: Our existence as observers around a G-dwarf star
should be considered as a random sample among the set of all
observers in G-, K- and M-dwarf systems.
We will assume P1 is true in our analysis that follows. We will
consider the implications of P1 on the fact that we exist around
a G-dwarf star, rather than a K- or M-dwarf, both at the pre-
sent era and future of the Universe. Because we find ourselves
orbiting a G-dwarf star at an early stage of the Universe, must
we conclude that we are an unlikely statistical fluke? SSA2 pro-
vides us with a tool that, along with astronomical and
theoretical constraints, can help to resolve this problem.
The reference class
The issue of defining the reference class of observers is a long-
standing problem that we do not purport to solve here; instead,
we suggest an operational definition of the reference class as it
pertains to our particular scenario. Operational definitions of
reference class are commonly used in the search for extraterres-
trial intelligence (SETI), where only civilizations that have the
ability to utilize radio transmitters have any hope of communi-
cating. In the same vein, we attempt a broader operational def-
inition of reference class for our problem that is based upon
cognition, rather than technology.
First, although we talk about the reference class in relation
to an individual observer, it is not necessarily the case that all
members of the human species will retain the same capabilities
of wondering about our position around a G-dwarf instead of
an M-dwarf. A person in a coma, for example, cannot wonder
about such things due to circumstances, while a young child
may lack the full awareness to comprehend such a problem
until they become older. Nevertheless, cultures and individuals
without strong astronomy education may lack the knowledge
to understand the problem immediately, yet such people hold
the cognitive capability of understanding the relevant informa-
tion when taught. The operational reference class of observers
for this problem thus seems to require individuals with general
unimpaired human cognition along with the ability to compre-
hend modern scholarly information.
With this constraint inmind, we can better delineate the class
of individuals in our operational reference class. The pre-
human case is easiest to deal with, as we can imagine a point
in the past (such as the emergence of the genus Homo) where
our ancestors developed the capability to wonder about their
place in the universe and comprehend systematic astronomy.
Note that it is not required that ancestors in our operational
reference class actually performed astronomy or thought
about stellar types; rather, it is only relevant that they hold
the capability of understanding such knowledge if it were com-
petently taught to them. Prior to this point in history, we as-
sume that hominids earlier than Homo were outside of our
operational reference class and would be incapable of demon-
strating a comparable sort of human-like cognitive ability. We
likewise assume that other organisms on Earth are sufficiently
different than us in cognitive capabilities so as to place us in a
separate operational reference class3, as no other organism
2 Bostrom (2002) has developed an analogue to SSA that specifies one
should reason as if one’s observer-moment was randomly selected from
one’s reference class. This strong self-sampling assumption (SSSA) is an
attempt to render ambiguous some of the unpalatable paradoxes of SSA.
However, this particular analysis following P1 contains sufficient index-
ical information that SSSA effectively reduces to SSA for our scope of
interest.
3 Standish (2013) applies this form of reasoning to conclude that ‘ants
are not conscious’ by appealing to SSA: because the population of ants
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could seemingly comprehend the implications of modern
scholarly information (even if presented in an appropriate
form for the particular species).
We thus arrive at a definition of operational reference class
that applies to this particular problem (even if it lacks more
general applicability to other problems in philosophy):
Premise P2: Other observers are in the same operational ref-
erence class as us if they possess the cognitive ability to mean-
ingfully comprehend modern scholarly information.
Thus we include humans as well as possible extraterrestrials
that SETI could communicate with in our operational refer-
ence class, but we exclude rocks, plants, giraffes and other or-
ganisms that lack comparable capabilities as conscious
observers. We will assume P2 is true in the analysis that fol-
lows, which will allow us to consider the likelihood that
other observers in our operational reference class exist around
K- and M-dwarf stars at the present era and future of the
universe.
Analysis with Bayesian inference
We approach this problem through the framework of Bayesian
inference. As an example, consider a fair coin that is tossed
three times in a row. Suppose that all three tosses turn up
Heads. Can we conclude from this experiment that the coin
must be weighted? In fact, we can still maintain our hypothesis
that the coin is fair because the chances of getting three Heads
in a row are 1/8. Many events with a probability of 1/8 occur
every day and so we should not be concerned about an event
like this indicating that our initial assumptions are flawed.
However, if we were to flip the same coin 70 times in a row
with all 70 turning up Heads, we would readily conclude that
the experiment is fixed. This is because the probability of flip-
ping 70 Heads in a row is about 10−22, which is an exceedingly
unlikely event that has probably never happened in the history
of the universe. This informal description of Bayesian inference
provides a way to assess the probability of a hypothesis in light
of new evidence.
We can apply a more formal Bayesian analysis to our prob-
lem of inhabited planets in order to estimate the probability of
finding ourselves on a planet orbiting a G-dwarf star, rather
than an M-dwarf star4. We begin by defining the following
statements:
Hypothesis L= ‘A planet is inhabited by conscious life
(observers)’
Evidence G = ‘The planet orbits a G-dwarf star’
Evidence K = ‘The planet orbits a K-dwarf star’
Evidence M = ‘The planet orbits a M-dwarf star’
Using these four statements, our goal is to determine the pos-
terior probabilities P(L|G) = ‘The probability that a planet is
inhabited by observers given that it orbits a G-dwarf star,’ P
(L|K) = ‘The probability that a planet is inhabited by observers
given that it orbits a K-dwarf star,’ and P(L|M) = ‘The prob-
ability that a planet is inhabited by observers given that it
orbits an M-dwarf star.’
In order to determine these posterior probabilities, we must
calculate or estimate the likelihoods, which indicate the com-
patibility of our evidence with our hypothesis. We can express
these likelihood quantities as P(G|L) = ‘The probability that a
planet orbits a G-dwarf star given that it is inhabited by obser-
vers,’ P(K|L) = ‘The probability that a planet orbits a K-dwarf
star given that it is inhabited by observers,’ and P(M|L) = ‘The
probability that a planet orbits an M-dwarf star given that it is
inhabited by observers.’
We can express the relationship between our likelihood and
posterior using Bayes’ theorem:
P(L|G) = P(L)P(G|L)
P(G) , (1)
where P(L) is the probability of conscious observers
inhabiting a planet (known as the prior probability) and P
(G) is the fraction of G-dwarf stars in the galaxy (known as
the model evidence). We can express the fraction of
G-dwarf stars as
P(G) = NG
Nw
, (2)
where NG is the total number of G-dwarf stars and N⋆ is the
total number of stars in the galaxy over all stellar types. We
can also express our prior probability for expecting observers
elsewhere in the galaxy by invoking theDrake Equation, which
we write as
P(L) = NC
Nw
, (3)
whereNC is the total number of communicative civilizations in
the galaxy for all stellar types. We can then reduce our expres-
sion for the G-dwarf posterior probability to
P(L|G) = NC
NG
P(G|L). (4)
Likewise, we can write similar expressions for the K-dwarf and
M-dwarf posterior probability as:
P(L|K) = NC
NK
P(K|L), (5)
P(L|M) = NC
NM
P(M|L). (6)
on the Earth vastly outnumbers the population of humans, we must con-
clude that ants are not in our reference class – or else we are left with the
conclusion that our birth as humans, rather than ants, is an unlikely stat-
istical fluke.
4 Our use of Bayesian statistics implicitly assumes that the number of
planets inhabited by conscious observers over the history of the
Universe is a statistically significant quantity. However, if the number
of such planets is extremely small (e.g., if Earth is the only inhabited pla-
net across all space and time), then Bayesian methods are not
meaningful.
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We can now express the ratio of these posteriors, known as the
posterior odds, as:
P(L|K)
P(L|G) =
NG
NK
P(K |L)
P(G|L) , (7)
P(L|M)
P(L|G) =
NG
NM
P(M|L)
P(G|L) . (8)
Equation (7) provides us with an expression for the ratio of the
probabilities that favor conscious beings observing themselves
orbiting a K-dwarf star compared with a G-dwarf star (here-
after known as the ‘K-dwarf posterior odds’). Likewise, equa-
tion (8) expresses the posterior odds that favour observers in an
M-dwarf compared with a G-dwarf stellar system (hereafter
known as the ‘M-dwarf posterior odds’). Note that by using
this posterior odds ratio, rather than explicitly using posterior
probabilities, the term NC from the Drake Equation cancels
out; our results therefore do not require explicit knowledge
of the abundance of intelligent life in the galaxy. We use this
formalism in our discussion below that examines several
observationally-motivated choices of the likelihood and its im-
plication for the posterior odds of observing ourselves around a
G-dwarf, rather than a K-dwarf or M-dwarf, star.
Spatial distribution of observers
We first consider the distribution of observers in space at the
present time, assuming that observers are restricted to planets
orbiting either G-, K-, or M-dwarf stars. We exclude F-dwarfs
and hotter stellar types as candidates for hosting conscious life
because we assume that biological evolution requires at least a
few billion years of stable main sequence conditions. This
allows us to examine three distinct scenarios for planets in
the habitable zone: a modest stellar population (G-dwarfs);
a large stellar population (K-dwarfs); and a large stellar popu-
lation where synchronous rotation is expected (M-dwarfs).
Actual observations show that each of these categorizations
has a wide range of variation, with some late K-dwarfs likely
to experience similar problems as M-dwarfs. We neglect these
complexities for now, noting that our conclusions for K-dwarfs
are particularly applicable to early- to mid-K-dwarfs, while our
conclusions for M-dwarfs extend to late K-dwarfs where tidal
synchronization is expected.
We consider a planet as being ‘habitable’ if it is able to sus-
tain standing liquid water on its surface for a long enough
duration that could allow for the evolution of life. Our reli-
ance upon calculations of this liquid water habitable zone as-
sumes that life will necessarily require a rocky planet and
liquid water to survive. We assume that habitability is a ne-
cessary condition for a planet to contain observers, although
this need not imply that all habitable planets must be inhab-
ited with observers. We acknowledge that this assumption
overlooks additional factors that may contribute to habit-
ability other than the location in the liquid water habitable
zone. Various factors contribute to the total number of pla-
nets that should be expected around a given planetary sys-
tem, particularly because planet formation as well as planet
migration may show unique behaviours around different stel-
lar types. For example, some predictions such as the packed
planetary system hypothesis even suggest that terrestrial pla-
nets may be more closely-spaced around smaller stars
(Raymond et al. 2009; Kopparapu & Barnes 2010), which
might increase the likelihood of inhabited planets around
M-dwarfs. TRAPPIST-1 provides observational support
for the packed planetary system hypothesis, with seven pla-
nets orbiting within 0.063 AU. In addition, we also do not ac-
count for exotic biochemistries that might allow life to exist
outside the traditional liquid water habitable zone. Likewise,
we do not explicitly assess the habitability of exomoons that
orbit beyond the limits of the habitable zone, even though
tidal heating and planetary illumination could provide en-
ergy to such worlds (Heller 2012; Heller & Barnes 2013).
Nevertheless, until other indicators for the existence of a hab-
itable planet are forthcoming (for example, evidence from
spectroscopic biosignatures), the primary parameter to as-
sess habitability at this time is the location of a planet in
the habitable zone of its host star. Our calculations that fol-
low should be considered as illustrative, as the observed num-
ber of habitable planets as a function of stellar type will
inevitably be updated with future exoplanet characterization
missions.
We are a statistical fluke at the present time
Using constraints from habitable zone climate model calcula-
tions (Kopparapu et al. 2013, 2014, 2016; Leconte et al. 2013;
Yang et al. 2013, 2014; Wolf & Toon 2015; Haqq-Misra et al.
2016), we can calculate the K-dwarf (equation 7) andM-dwarf
(equation 8) posterior odds as a function of the width of the li-
quid water habitable zone. Beginning with the calculated width
of the habitable zone in units of stellar flux, FHZ, we can ob-
tain the width of the habitable zone, HZ, in terms of physical
radial distance as HZi =
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
li/FHZi
√
, where l is stellar luminos-
ity and i ∈ {G, K, M} denotes stellar type. Using this relation-
ship, we write the likelihood function in a general form as:
P(i|L) = NiHZi
NGHZG +NKHZK +NMHZM , (9)
where HZG, HZK and HZM are the respective calculated
widths of the habitable zone (in units of radial distance). For
the G-dwarf likelihood (i =G), equation (9) implies that the
probability that a planet orbits a G-dwarf star, given the planet
is inhabited, depends upon the fractional width of the G-dwarf
habitable zone (i.e, how much habitable ‘real estate’ is avail-
able around a G-dwarf?) and the relative fraction of the
G-dwarf stars in our Galaxy (i.e, how common are G-dwarf
stars?). Similarly, equation (9) expresses the K-dwarf (i=K)
and M-dwarf (i=M) likelihood functions. We limit our con-
sideration in this analysis to three stellar types, which requires
that P(G|L)+P(K|L)+P(M|L) = 1.
We can use model calculations for the inner edge
(Kopparapu et al. 2013, 2014, 2016; Leconte et al. 2013;
Yang et al. 2013, 2014; Wolf & Toon 2015) and outer edge
(Kopparapu et al. 2013, 2014; Haqq-Misra et al. 2016) of the
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habitable zone to findHZG,HZK andHZM.We first note that
one-dimensional (1D) climate models (Kopparapu et al. 2013,
2014) find the inner edge of the habitable zone for a G-dwarf at
FHZG,inner& 1.1S0 and the outer edge at FHZG,outer& 0.35S0
(where S0 is the present-day value of Solar flux). For K-dwarfs,
results from 1D climate models as well as more complex gen-
eral circulation models (Haqq-Misra et al. 2016; Kopparapu
et al. 2016) show that the inner edge is at FHZK,inner& 1S0
and the outer edge is at FHZK,outer& 0.26S0. For
M-dwarfs, we focus on results from general circulation mod-
els (Yang et al. 2013, 2014; Kopparapu et al. 2016) because
such models are able to quantify the three-dimensional
aspects of atmospheric circulation on a synchronously rotat-
ing planet. These calculations show that planets in synchron-
ous rotation around an M-dwarf have an inner edge at
FHZM,inner& 1.5S0 and an outer edge at FHZM,outer&
0.25S0. If we assume that lK = 0.1lG and lM= 0.01lG as nominal
values, then we can calculate the respective habitable zone
widths for G-, K- and M-dwarfs in units of radial distance as:
HZG =
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
1/0.35
√ − NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe1/1.1√ = 0.74 AU, HZK =
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
0.1/0.26
√ −NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
0.1/1.0
√ = 0.30 AU and HZM =
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
0.01/0.35
√ − NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe0.01/1.5√ =
0.12 AU. Note that even though the habitable zone is much
larger for K- and M-dwarfs when measured in stellar flux
(FHZouter – FHZinner) compared with G-dwarfs, the actual
habitable zone widths are comparably smaller for K- and
M-dwarfs because of their lower luminosity.
We know from observations thatNG/N⋆= 0.07,NK/N⋆= 0.12
and NM/N⋆= 0.77. We then obtain values for our three likeli-
hoods: P(G|L)& 0.29, P(K|L)& 0.20 and P(M|L)& 0.51.
This reduces our expressions for posterior odds in equations
(7) and (8) to:
P(L|K)
P(L|G) ≈ 0.40, (10)
P(L|M)
P(L|G) ≈ 0.16. (11)
These results do not require us to discard our assumed likeli-
hoods, nor do we need to reject anthropic reasoning. We are
much less likely to favour our existence around an M-dwarf
star, so the fact that we instead exist around a G-dwarf star
remains consistent with our calculated posterior odds. We
therefore arrive at our first conclusion, with the assumption
that G-, K- and M-dwarf stars are equally probable hosts for
conscious observers at the present time:
Conclusion C1: Our existence around a G-dwarf star at the
present era is expected, with about a 90% lower likelihood
of instead existing around an M-dwarf star today.
Although M-dwarfs are much more numerous than G-dwarfs,
the larger physical space of the habitable zone (HZG >HZM)
makes G-dwarfs slightly more likely for hosting conscious ob-
servers. For observers across space at the present time, C1 sug-
gests that we can reason that our existence around a G-dwarf
star is to be expected, even if K- andM-dwarfs provide numer-
ous habitable planets.
Observers are less numerous on planets orbiting M-dwarf stars
at the present time
One possibility is that observers are less numerous on planets
orbiting M-dwarf stars. A variety of factors such as synchron-
ous rotation, stellar flaring activity and water loss during pre-
main sequence evolution could exacerbate or preclude life on
such planets. If we accept this class of arguments as valid,
then this implies that the M-dwarf posterior odds are less
than the G-dwarf and K-dwarf posterior odds.
Historically, the problem of synchronous rotation for pla-
nets within the habitable zone of M-dwarfs has suggested
that such planets are uninhabitable. Dole (1964) first argued
that the atmosphere of a synchronously rotating planet is
prone to freeze out on the permanent night side of the planet,
which would render the planet an airless and uninhabitable
ball of ice. This line of reasoning concludes that M-dwarf pla-
nets are likely to be uninhabitable, even if they are within the
habitable zone, so that P(M|L)& 0. This implies that the best
candidates for life are planets around G- and K-dwarf stars
where synchronous rotation is not a problem within the habit-
able zone. However, Haberle et al. (1996) used a simplified cli-
mate model to argue that energy transport from the day to
night side of a synchronously rotating planet is sufficient to
keep even thin atmospheres from collapsing. This result was
substantiated with more sophisticated calculations using gen-
eral circulation models by Joshi et al. (1997) and others
(Joshi 2003; Merlis & Schneider 2010; Edson et al. 2011,
2012; Carone et al. 2014; Yang et al. 2013, 2014; Kopparapu
et al. 2016), which all indicate that a wide range of synchron-
ously rotating atmospheres are able to withstand collapse.
Synchronous rotation itself seems to pose less of a problem
for habitability than originally proposed by Dole (1964) and
others.
More recent investigations have highlighted other problems
that could preclude the development of life around M-dwarf
planets. Most notable is that planets forming around
M-dwarf stars are likely to find themselves in a runaway green-
house state during the hot and extended pre-main sequence
phase of the host star (Ramirez & Kaltenegger 2014; Luger
& Barnes 2015; Tian & Ida 2015). Unless such planets are
able to regain water through delivery by impactors at a later
stage, this problem of pre-main sequence water loss could pre-
vent the development of life on many M-dwarf planets. Other
problems include flares from the enhanced stellar activity of
M-dwarfs (Segura et al. 2010) or the possible deficiency in vo-
latiles for such planets during formation (Lissauer 2007). Even
though M-dwarfs are more numerous, complications such as
these could lead us to conclude that other factors favour the
emergence of conscious observers around G- and K-dwarf
stars.
However, several studies offer some respite to these pro-
blems. Yang et al. (2013) find that slow and synchronously ro-
tating planets develop thick substellar cloud decks, which
strongly cool the planet and may in part, help mitigate pre-
main sequence water-loss. Furthermore, Tian & Ida (2015)
argue that M-dwarf planets may form in two primary modes,
Why do we find ourselves around a yellow star? 81
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1473550417000118
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Nasa Goddard Space Flight Ctr, on 26 Mar 2019 at 17:13:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
either as dry desert planets or as waterworlds with a much
greater oceanic volume than Earth. Desert planets can remain
habitable under a wider range of stellar fluxes because water
vapour and sea-ice albedo feedbacks are nonexistent (Abe
et al. 2011; Leconte et al. 2013), although such planets may
be less desirable candidates for hosting life. Deep water-world
planets may allow extended periods of water-loss without fully
desiccating the planet, still leaving an ocean behind after the
pre-main sequence phase and pose no problems to the develop-
ment of advanced life. Theoretical photochemical modelling
studies indicate that even strongly flaring M-dwarf stars, like
AD Leo, would not present a direct hazard for life on planet
the surface, given an Earth-like atmosphere with O2 and O3
that provides an ultraviolet shield (Segura et al. 2010). These
arguments and others (Tarter et al. 2007) all suggest that at
least some planets orbiting M-dwarfs could develop advanced
forms of life (in which case the conclusion C1 is still justified).
Appealing to physical limitations on habitability does
solve the problem of why we do not orbit an M-dwarf star.
If we accept these arguments as valid, then we can assume
P(M|L)& 0, which considers the limiting case in equation
(9) where M-dwarf planets are completely uninhabitable.
This assumption yields three new values for our likelihoods:
P(G|L)& 0.59, P(K|L)& 0.41 and P(M|L)& 0. We can then
calculate new posterior odds with our pessimistic assumptions
about M-dwarf habitability:
P(L|K)
P(L|G) ≈ 0.41, (12)
P(L|M)
P(L|G) ≈ 0. (13)
These results not only resolve the M-dwarf observer problem,
but they also adjust our posterior odds for K-dwarfs. Most of
the physical constraints on habitability for planets orbiting
M-dwarf stars (such as synchronous rotation and stellar activ-
ity) do not apply to the early- to mid-K-dwarf systems that we
also consider. This leads to our second conclusion, with the as-
sumption that M-dwarf stars are much less probable hosts for
conscious observers than G- and K-dwarfs at the present time:
Conclusion C2: If M-dwarfs are less hospitable hosts for hab-
itable planets, then our existence around a G-dwarf star at the
present era is to be expected, with nearly half the likelihood of
instead existing around a K-dwarf star today.
Thus, if we assume that M-dwarf planets are problematic for
life, then we should further consider it typical that we find our-
selves orbiting a G-dwarf star, with a slightly less likelihood of
instead orbiting a K-dwarf star.
Temporal distribution of observers
We next consider the distribution of observers in space and
across all time, still assuming that observers are restricted to
planets orbiting in the liquid water habitable zone either
G-dwarf, K-dwarf or M-dwarf stars. Conscious life on Earth
took about 4.5 billion years to develop after the planet formed,
but with a sample size of one we cannot predict how typical this
timescale may be for other stellar environments. The longer
main sequence lifetime of K- andM-dwarfs provides addition-
al time for the requisite biological evolution and the develop-
ment of conscious observers. We must therefore extend our
framework to consider the likelihood that we should exist on
a G-dwarf star today, rather than a K- or M-dwarf star in
the distant future.
We are a statistical fluke across all time
The first step in considering the distribution of observers across
time is to modify our argument in the section ‘We are a statis-
tical fluke at the present time’ to account for the expected life-
time of each stellar type. We assume that habitability is limited
to the main sequence lifetime of a star, with a typical lifetime of
tG = 10
10 years for G-dwarf stars, tK = 10
11 years for K-dwarf
stars and up to tM= 10
13 years for small M-dwarf stars. We
consider the distribution of habitable planets across the entire
history of the universe from time t= 0 to t= tM, which is the
timeframe when conscious observers could arise. We can
write the fractions of the age of the universe that each stellar
type remains in its main sequence phase as fG = tG/tM= 10
−3,
fK = tK/tM= 10
−2 and fM= tM/tM= 1.We can then write a new
expression for our likelihood function that takes into account
this temporal effect:
P(i|L) = fiNiHZi
fGNGHZG + fKNKHZK + fMNMHZM , (14)
This gives three new values for our likelihoods: P(G|L)&
5.6 × 10−4, P(K|L)& 3.9 × 10−3 and P(M|L)& 0.99. We can
now express the K- and M-dwarf posterior odds for habitable
planets across time as:
P(L|K)
P(L|G) ≈ 4.0, (15)
P(L|M)
P(L|G) ≈ 160. (16)
This leads to our third conclusion, with the assumption that
G-, K- and M-dwarf stars are equally probable hosts for con-
scious observers across all time:
ConclusionC3: Our existence around aG-dwarf star is unlike-
ly, with over a hundred times greater likelihood of existing
around an M-dwarf star in the future.
This does not necessarily mean that anthropic reasoning has
failed, but only that we have found ourselves in a less than aver-
age, although not wholly improbably, stellar environment. The
M-dwarf posterior odds tell us that we are over 100 times more
likely to find ourselves around anM-dwarf star than aG-dwarf
star. This is a less optimistic number than our present-day es-
timate with equation (11), but does this mean that we must re-
ject our assumed likelihoods? Is a 1 in 100 chance reasonable
within anthropic considerations, or do must we reject anthrop-
ic reasoning here? In fact, plenty of events occur all the time
with a chance of 1 in 100 or more. Approximately 1% of people
are ambidextrous, while nearly the same fraction is born with
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red hair. Scaling further up, for the sake of argument, could we
accept even a 1 in 10 000 chance to account for our existence
around a G-dwarf? The odds are about 1 in 10 000 that a per-
son has been bitten by aMalaria-carryingmosquito or can sing
with perfect pitch. About 1 in 10 000 people are involved in a
flood, a landslide, or a grizzly bear attack. All of these events
are realistic and occur on a regular basis, even if not a daily
basis. Thus, we need not necessarily reject anthropic reasoning
or our likelihoods because it also remains plausible that con-
scious life on Earth is a one-chance-in-a-hundred fluke.
Observers are unlikely on planets orbiting M-dwarf stars
across all time
To complement our discussion from the section ‘Observers are
less numerous on planets orbiting M-dwarf stars at the present
time’, we consider the possibility that planets orbitingM-dwarf
stars may be unsuitable environments for life, either now or at
any point in the future. If M-dwarf planets are completely in-
hospitable to life, then P(M|L)& 0 and the M-dwarf posterior
odds are zero. This assumption yields three new values for our
likelihoods: P(G|L)& 0.13, P(K|L)& 0.87 and P(M|L)& 0.
We can then calculate new posterior odds with our pessimistic
assumptions aboutM-dwarf habitability over the history of the
universe:
P(L|K)
P(L|G) ≈ 3.9, (17)
P(L|M)
P(L|G) ≈ 0. (18)
We thus arrive at our fourth conclusion, with the assumption
that M-dwarf stars are much less probable hosts for conscious
observers than G- and K-dwarfs across all time:
Conclusion C4: If M-dwarfs are less hospitable hosts for hab-
itable planets, then our existence around a G-dwarf star is a
slight statistical fluke, with about a four times greater likeli-
hood of existing around a K-dwarf star in the future.
We need not be concerned about a one in four chance for our
existence around a G-dwarf compared with a K-dwarf. Nearly
one in four people in the world follow Islam, while about one in
five live in China; such characteristics are commonplace, even
if they do not describe the majority of people. It is tempting to
conclude based on physical reasons, as well as the posterior
odds from equation (16), that conscious observers should not
exist on planets orbiting M-dwarf stars. While we can appeal
to small deviations from the mean to explain our position
around a G-dwarf star instead of a K-dwarf star, we require
even more extraordinary circumstances to explain why we do
not exist around anM-dwarf star in the future. Rather than ac-
cept the improbable outcome of equation (16), perhaps the
combination of anthropic reasoning and climate research sug-
gests that assumptions like those in equation (18) are correct. If
M-dwarfs planets really do experience a range of problems that
limits their potential for developing life, then we can reason
that our place around a G-dwarf today is a common environ-
ment for observers to find themselves.
Discussion
If this analysis had turned up amuch larger number, such as a 1
in 1022 chance of us finding ourselves around a G-dwarf star,
then of course we would have to reject either our likelihoods or
anthropic reasoning, because we essentially never expect to ob-
serve events with a 1 in 1022 chance. But this is not what we
have found, so we need not be concerned about finding our-
selves in a less-than-typical cosmic environment. So, to return
to the question at the title of this paper: we find ourselves orbit-
ing a G-dwarf star because we are a little bit of a statistical
anomaly, but only the sort of anomaly that we experience on
a regular basis.
This still leaves open the degree of atypicality we are claim-
ing for ourselves. Understanding the habitability of M-dwarf
planets is critical to resolving this ambiguity: if M-dwarf pla-
nets are poor candidates for life, then the distant future 10 tril-
lion years from now may be a worse time for the emergence of
conscious observers in our reference class than the present era.
Theoreticians have identified several possible problems that
could preclude the development of life on M-dwarf planets, al-
though others have suggested plausible resolutions that could
still maintain habitable conditions. One interpretation of this
state of affairs is that climate models contain too many
Earth-like assumptions and M-dwarf habitability problems
tend to disappear when we develop more robust tools for simu-
lating a wider range of planetary atmospheres. Another inter-
pretation is that our knowledge of planetary systems is
functional enough that we can claim with confidence that
M-dwarf systems are poorer environments for life than
G-dwarf systems. Observational resolution of this dilemma
will be difficult and may only be possibly when spectroscopic
measurements of the atmospheres of M-dwarf planets become
possible with the next generation of space telescopes.
Further observations pending, the best we can do is appeal
to SSA and claim that our present status as conscious observers
may as well be randomly selected from the set of total observers
in our reference class (across the entire past, present and future
of the universe). We find ourselves around a G-dwarf star at an
early stage in the universe, which according to C3 is disfa-
voured by a factor of *100 to our existence around an
M-dwarf star. Although claiming our existence to be a 1 in
100 statistical fluke remains within the realm of possibility, is
such a conclusion philosophically satisfying? Or should we
take this as an indication that our physical intuitions about
M-dwarf habitability may also be correct? Perhaps our com-
bined expectations from planetary habitability theory and an-
thropic reasoning with SSA both point toward the conclusion
C4 thatM-dwarf planets really aremore difficult places for life.
Another perspective on this problem derives from the
doomsday argument (Carter & McCrea 1983; Gott 1993;
Bostrom 2002), which considers the longevity of our current
reference class as observers. Succinctly, the doomsday argu-
ment supposes that if humans are born in a random order,
we should assume from SSA to be sequentially somewhere
near the middle of the population distribution. When coupled
with our rapid exponential growth in population, this suggests
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that we will reach the predicted total number of humans fairly
soon in the future. Thus, the argument goes, doomsday (of one
sort or another) becomes more probable when one considers
their birth rank as typical (i.e., randomly selected as with
SSA). If the doomsday argument is correct, then human civil-
ization as we know it is much closer to its end than its
beginning.
The doomsday argument sounds objectionable to many at
first and has generated broad discussion both in favour and
against its conclusions (e.g., Korb & Oliver 1998; Bostrom
1999, 2002; Olum 2002; Bostrom & Ćirković 2003; Monton
2003). We do not necessarily endorse the strong conclusions
of the doomsday argument here; instead, we note that the pro-
spect of so-called doomsday need not correlate to a global ca-
tastrophe or existential threat. In general, any significant
transformation that places post-humans in a different reference
class as humans today would qualify as satisfying the criterion
for doomsday. The concept of a post-human, or transhuman,
can refer to any biological or technological development in the
future that results in humans now evolving into something not-
ably different than (and probably reproductively incompatible
with) humans today. For example, we do not include animals
such as cats or owls in our operational reference class because
such organisms hold a limited set of cognitive capabilities to
qualify as observers on the same terms as us. Likewise, we
can imagine a technological or biological development that
places post-humans in a new operational reference class. One
form of such transformation is the suggestion by Kurzweil
(2005) and others that humans will soon be able to transfer
our biology-based intelligence into robot brains that live
much longer. Another possibility suggested by Grinspoon
(2009) and others is that the universe is populated by ‘immor-
tal’ long-lived civilizations that have transcended their pro-
blems of sustainable development. Perhaps more likely, a
shift in our operational reference class will be due to long-term
genetic changes that result when any biological creature
evolves over time. Just as we can envision a point in the past
when distant pre-human ancestors would not be considered
part of our operational reference class, so too can we imagine
a threshold where distant post-human descendants are also no
longer considered part of our operational reference class. At
some point in the future, humans will be drastically different
than we are now.
Haussler (2016) raises the possibility that our unlikely pos-
ition at this early phase of the universe provides confidence
that we are entering an era of ‘interstellar convergence,’
where emergent interstellar communication networks between
extraterrestrial civilizations in the galaxy will soon grow
powerful enough that they become a permanent feature of
future civilizations. Haussler (2016) argues that we are more
likely to find ourselves wondering about the existence of extra-
terrestrial life if we exist at a stage in the universe’s history when
interstellar communication between civilizations is just begin-
ning. By contrast, if such interstellar convergence never occurs,
or if it occurs in the distant future, then we would expect to find
ourselves at a more typical era in the universe’s history, much
later in the future (and probably around an M-dwarf star).
Thus, Haussler (2016) claims that the success of SETI and
the establishment of an era of interstellar convergence will pro-
pel humanity into our next evolutionary state – and necessarily,
into a different operational reference class. According to this
logic, we find ourselves around a G-dwarf star at an early
phase in the universe because this is the most likely place and
time to expect observers in our operational reference class.
Although compelling as a motivation for SETI, the argu-
ment of Haussler (2016) cannot distinguish between events
that positively transform humanity (such as entering an era
of interstellar convergence) and events that negatively trans-
form humanity (such as a literal doomsday that ends with ex-
tinction). Whether or not interstellar convergence is likely, it
remains possible that the operational reference class of obser-
vers itself is a function of time in the universe. If observers like
us (i.e., in our operational reference class) do not exist in the
future, then we are left with the present-day spatial conclusions
C1 and C2, which suggest that our position around a G-dwarf
is reasonably typical.
Whether by biological evolution or technological enhance-
ment, it seems inescapable to conclude that post-humans will
be at least as cognitively capable as humans and probably
much more so. We therefore cannot exclude post-humans
from our operational reference class on the condition of
less-than-human cognitive abilities. Instead, we also suppose
that post-humans will have access to a greater wealth of infor-
mation than available today, which could render obsolete some
of our current modes of thinking. For example, the scenario
envisioned byHaussler (2016) suggests that the advent of wide-
spread interstellar communication could lead to a transform-
ation of our operational reference class; observers born into
such a universe would have no need to wonder about their
relationship to others because such information would be
known. Another possibility could revolve around the temporal
perception of a conscious being (DeVito 2011). Humans have
lifespans of *100 years with daily activities on the order of
hours and thoughts that occupy seconds to minutes.
Post-humans that evolve to operate on different timescales
may fall into different modes of conscious thought than our
current operational reference class. Other imaginative and
mundane possibilities can be explored, but the point remains
that our present operational reference class may be short-lived
even if humans evolve into a post-human species.
The idea that the operational reference class of observers
may depend upon the relevant timescale for the species in
question deserves additional consideration. G-dwarf stars are
shorter lived thanM-dwarfs, but G-dwarfs have a greater lumi-
nosity during the main sequence phase. Perhaps the evolution
of life on planetary systems develops on a timescale propor-
tional to the lifetime of the star itself, so that M-dwarfs today
should not expect to develop any form of advanced life until
much later in the future. This suggests the possibility that the
operational reference class of observers depends upon stellar
type, perhaps as a result of life developing to prefer different
timescales of operation on G-dwarfs compared with
M-dwarfs. If this line of reasoning is valid at all, then we should
not expect to find signs of conscious observers on M-dwarf
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planets today, while G-dwarf and early K-dwarf planets pro-
vide better places to look. This line of reasoning leads to our
fifth conclusion:
Conclusion C5: If observers in our operational reference class
do not exist in the future, then our existence around aG-dwarf
star at the present era is to be expected.
We therefore find ourselves orbiting a G-dwarf star in an
early phase of the universe because this is precisely where
we expect observers in our operational reference class should
exist.
Conclusion
Our place around aG-dwarf star, instead of aK- orMdwarf, is
a typical occurrence that requires no special circumstances to
explain. Even if we accept that M-dwarf planets provide
more numerous habitable sites across the history of the uni-
verse, our existence around a G-dwarf star would only be the
sort of statistical fluke that occurs on a routine basis. Even so,
our application of anthropic reasoning provides corroborating
evidence to theoretical expectations that suggestM-dwarf hab-
itability may be limited. If we allow for at least some reduction
in the suitability of M-dwarf planets for life, then we arrive at
an even stronger conclusion that our position on a planet
around a G-dwarf is reasonably typical.
Our analysis also depends upon the idea that other
observers in our operational reference class are likely to exist
around other stellar types. But this assumption could be
flawed, particularly if the operational reference class of obser-
vers is itself a function of stellar luminosity and therefore stellar
type. Post-humans, too, may transition toward a new oper-
ational reference class – perhaps through a breakthrough in
technology, perhaps through initiation of contact with
extraterrestrials, or perhaps (although hopefully not) through
the extinction of humanity. If we accept that our current oper-
ational reference class status is finite and if we further accept
that the concept of reference class itself may be linked to stellar
type, then we are left with the conclusion that the present time
and place is optimal for expecting observers like us.
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